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Are Brazil's delays in adopting a stabilization program related to
the finding that Brazil's high inflation hurts the lower and middle
classes far more than the rich, who insulate themselves from its
effects by taking advantage of high real interest rates on demand
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Most  studies  of how inflation  affects  income  estimated  19 percent a year,  of which 16  percent
distribution  focus  only on wages or the inflation  is attributable  to the erosion  of  eal wages  and
tax. Kane and Morisett  argue  that this approach  the rest to the inflation  tax.
could  be misleading  as it ignores important
channels  through  which infladon  affects  income  * During  the same period,  Braz:l's middle
distribution.  class, which  lost close  to 30 percent  of its annual
income,  was  devastated  because  of its limited
The authors  present  an integrated  framework  access to indexed  assets.
that combines  interest-bearing  assets with  labor
income  and cash holdings This allows  them to  * But the richest  quintile  manag-d to insulate
describe  clearly  the conditions  under which  itself from inflation  by taking advartage of high
inflation  will create  gainers  and losers.  real interest on demand  deposits  - without
losing from reduced  labor  income. Had real
They apply  the model to Brazil,  which is a  assets and subsidized  credit been  considered  in
prime candidate  for this exercise  because  its  the analysis,  the regressive  effects  of inflation
3conomy  combines  skewed  income distribution  would  probably  lave been even worse,  say Kane
and high inflation.  They show that in Brazil  and Morisett.
infladion  helped worsen  i.,come  distribution  in
the 1980s.  Their major findings  are as follows:  This raises a question:  Do these findings
about  the distributional  effects of inflation  help
In 1980-89,  the inflation-induced  income  explain  Brazil's delavs  in adopting  a stabilization
loss for the lowest quintile  in Brazil was an  program?
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The interactions  between  a stable macroeconomic  environment  and sustainable
economic  growth have  attracted considerable  attention  in the literature (see Levine and
Zervos (1993) for a recent survey of this extensive  literature).  Fischer (1993), for instance,
shows  that inflation  has a negative  impact on growth for a large sanple of developing
countries over the last twenty years. More and more, economists  are also emphasizing  the
detrimental  effect of inflation on income distributioin,  hence on social stability in developing
countries (Blejer and Guerrero (1990), Cardoso (1991) Sturzenegger  (1992)).
Ther- are at least four channels through which inflation  can alter income
distribution. The first one is related  to the differential  indexation  of wages  across income
groups.  T'hese  groups do not have  the same bargaining  power when it comes to the inflation
correction of nominal  wages. A broader explanation  is the overall shift in wage  profile that
is associated  with high inflation. This shift has been shown  to work in favor  of more
educated  and wealthier  agents (Pessino 1991). The second channel is linked to the
differences  in asset demand across income groups. Usually, as inflation  rises, agents shift
their asset demands from domestic liquidity  towards  foreign currency  (i.e, dollarization)
and/or domestic interest earning instruments. However,.  access to domestic  indexed  as;ets or
foreign denominated  instruments  is generally  positively correlated to the level of income as
recently  argued by Sturzenegger  (1992).  On this basis, the generalized  intuition .s that
inflation  worsens  income distribution  because it taxes more heavily the poor, who hold
proportionally  more cash balances. The third channel works through  liabilities  as subsidized
loans, mainly housing,  are disproportionately  allocated  to certain groups.  The subsidized
interest rate is often not fully indexed  to inflation. Thefourth channel is related  to the
distribution  of the gains arising from the so called Tanzi-Olivera  effect.  Indeed, tax
instruments  are not subject to the same payment lags and the burden of these taxes is not
equally shared by all individuals. The significant  drop in government  revenues  in period of
high inflation suggests  that this implicit  transfer can have  a profound  effect  on income
distribution.'
1.  For example  in Bolivia, central Government tax revenue fell from 10.9
percent of GDP in the  1970s to  1.3 percent of GDP  in 1985.  This took
place as the annual inflation rate reached 12,000 percent.  Similarly, in
Brazil dt'ring the early  1980s, income taxes on earnings of a given
(continued...)-3 -
The purpose of this paper is to present a simple analytical  framework  that allows a
quantitative  assessment  of the impact  of inf.ation  on income distribution. This general
framework  is applied to the case of Brazil, whose unique combination  of a skewed income
distribution  and persistently  high inflation  rates makes a prime candidate  for this exercise.
We find that indeed inflation  contributed  to the worsening  of income distribution 'n Brazil.
This occurred through the erosion of real wages  for the poor and the inflation  tax for the
middle class.  As inflation  accelerated,  access to indexed  assets for the rich also contributed
to a deterioration  of income distribution. Ultimately,  these findings  raise questions  about the
political economy  of infation in Brazil
The rest of the paper is organized  as follows. Section  II presents the analytical
framework  and discusses  the theoretical  underpinnings. The following  section applies the
model to Brazil and provides  a simulation  exercise. In the process, we show  that the
currently used measure of income distribution  underestimates  the actual inequality. As
revenues  from financial  assets are virtually omitted from households  surveys,  an important
channel through which an increase  in inflation  affects  income distribution is not taken into
account.  The last section offers concluding  remarks.
fl.  Analytical  Framework
This section aims at highlighting  in a more rigoroua way  the channels  through  which
inflation  alter income distribution. Mostly because of data limitations,  the third and fourth
effect (i.e subsidized  credit and Tanzi-olivera  effect) will be omitted  from the discussion. It
should be emphasized,  however,  that the significant  drop in real government  revenues
alluded to earlier and the concomitant  increasing  reliance on indirect taxes experimented  by
countries facing high inflation  rates, suggests  that it is wnrth examining. The holds 'br the
inflation  incidence  of subsidized  credit merits.  For the time being, we concentrate  in a tax
free world without  credit markets in which individuals  have  labor and capital as sources of
1 (. ..  continued)
calendar yea: were due the fbllowing  calendar year without  any inflation
adjustment  (Simonsen 1983).- 4 -
income. The economy is divided into quintiles to capture the distributional  effects. 2
Formally,  total real .,icome of quintile i (Y.) is given by:
(1)  Yi =  W 1/P + r(K,/P)  with i  =1,2,3,4  and 5
where W, is labor income, P a price index, and r the real interest earned on capital income
(K,) held at the beginning  of the period.  The standard real wages  equation can be written as
a function of inflation (r)  and real GDP (Z):
(2)  W,/P =  w 1(ir, 7)  with wi,, <  0 and wi, >  0
The negative  impact  of inflation on real wages  is generally  justified by the existence
of nominal  wage  contracts. Although  the flexibility  of ncminal wage  contracts  tends to
increase in periods of high chronic inflation, the majority of recent empirical studies on Latin
American countries have  emphasized  that nonethe-less  wages  still lag behind inflation. For
example, Cardoso (1992) using a panel data of seven Latin American countries finds the
average  real wage  elasticity to inflation  to be -0.14, suggesting  that the negative  impact of
inflation  on real wages  is not trivial.  This general result, however,  provides little guidance
for assessing  the distributional  effects  of inflation  on wage  income as it hides the marked
differences  across countries and, more importantly,  across income groups. 3
The regressive  nature of inflation  on wages  can be explained  in the context  of the
human capital  theory.  This theory associates differences  in earning to educational  attainment
and experience  in the labor market.  Schultz (1975) has emphasized  how better educated
workers tend to have  better designed contracts. Empirical support for this argument can be
found in Pessino (1991), who shows  that the return on education  increased  by 17 percent in
Argentina  as the country was facing  an annual inflation  rate exceeding  5000 percent (1989).
The author concludes  that "inflation  is non-netitral  because it changes the structure  and
2.  Of course a further disaggregation of income groups, say by decile, could
be adopted but add to the number of variables without necessarily bringing
more insights.
3.  Not only the extent and forms of indWrition is likely to vary between
different income gro..  ; (related tr  level of education), but difference
may also exist between economic sectois.-5  -
inequality  of wages."  As we show  later when estimating  equation (2), the same qualitative
result holds for Brazil.
Inflation  will also alter income distribution  throuph its impact on the real rate of
return of alternative  assets, hence on the demand for these assets as well.  Increased
inequality  might result to the extent that low income groups are likely to hold proportionally
more cash ho.dings,  and have less access, if any, to indexed  assets.  With regard to cash
holdings,  the argument is consistent  with the fact that the Cagan type money  demand
equations  display  an income elasticity below unity.  There are many factors  that render the
inflatiGn  induced conversion  of domestic currency into foreign  currency  or dom-stic interest
bearing assets more costly for low income agents. One obvious limitation  is the existence  of
ininimum  deposits requirements  for indexed  assets.  Furthermore, in the contex: of a
oollarized  economy,  low income agents consume a relativeiy  higher proportion  of goods that
require domestic currency  to be purchased (Sturzenegger  (1992)).  This is compounded  by
the fact that the transaction  cost of converting  cash into lucrative  assets is fixed, hence a
decreasing  function of income. 4
Therefore,  the distributional  implications  of a change in the rate of inflation  will
depend on the range of assets avai"oble  and on the portfolio  choice of economic  agents. In
order to capture this process in our general framework, and without  loss of generality, we
introduce  two alternative  assets.  The first one is non-indexed  (M/P) (e.g. high-powered
money), and the second is partially or fully inde,-A to the rate of inflation  (A/P).  The
demand for these two respective  assets can be expressed as follows:
(3)  (M,/P)  =  m,(7r,Y;)  with mi,  <  0 and miy >  0
(4)  (A1/P)  - a,(ir,Y,)  with a,,  >  0 and a,Y  >  0
Equation (3) is the usual money  demand equation, which is a decreasing  function of
inflation and an increasing  function of income.  The demand for indexed  assets will rise with
inflation  and income. For simplicity,  we did not introduce  the real return of the indexed
4.  Note also that the rate of return on indexed financial instrument is often
positively associated with the amount of the transaction.  For example, in
Argentina or Brazil, nominal interest rates on banks deposits are positively
correlated to the amount of the deposit.-6 -
asset (r) in the demand equations.  We consider that the influeice of this variable is
captured, to a large extent, by changes in inflation. As argued  above, the response  of assets
demand to a change in the inflation  rate is likely to vary across incormie  groups.  It is
noteworthy  that the two above equations should be viewed  as part of ail integrated  portfolio
model.  Assuming  a liniear  budget constrain,, the marginal  chaayges  in consumption  induceed
by inflation  can be deduced from equations (3) and (4).5 The real income derived from
these assets can be written as follows:
(5)  Y  i =  -w/(I +r)Mi/P)
(6)  yA  -{(1+i)/(l+w)-l}(A,/P)
where i is the nominal  rate of return of the indexed  asset.  Equation (5) merely capturm the
well known inflation  tax.  At this point one needs to recognize  that the nonminal  interest rate
:s  likely to rise with inflation. The magnitude  of this adjustment  will wdry  with the degree of
financial  repression  prvailing in the economy. In general, such adjustment can be imbedded
in the model through the following  equation:
(7)  i  =  i(w)
lbtal income of the group i can be rewritten  by suDstituting  equations (3) .o (7) into
(1):
(8) Yi =  w('ir, Z) -[Xr/(l  +r)(mi(7r,Yi)] + [(1 +i(ir))/(l +7r)a(7r,YY)]
The preceding  equation simply states that total income is the sum of wages, income
from the non-indexed set,  and income froom  the indexed  asset.  Differentiating  equation (8)
with respect to inflation  will therefore  fully capture the changes in income attributed to
inflation: 6
5.  Accordingly, the sensitivity of consumption to inflation equals
Ci.  =  Yi.  - mi.  - ai,
6.  In deriving  equation (9) we use the equality presented in footnote (6) and ignore the
effect of in9ation on GDP through the wage equation (Z  =  EYi).  The latter omission, from
(continued...)-7  -
dY,  n, Wi, +  02  ci, +  (02  +  03)aj, +  04 (i,,.- 1) - (MK/P)
(9)  - =  >  or < 0
dwr  01(+02)
where  01 - (1+  )2 >  0  03  =  (i-T)(1+T)  >  or  <  0
02 =T(+  W)  >  G  04 = (A,/P) > O
The sign of equation (9,, which depends  entirely on the numerator,  cannot be
dtetermined  a  er;ori. The impact  of inflation  on income is influenced  by the five following
terms:
* The first tern  is negative  and eaptures the inflation  erosion of real wages
due to ihe indexation  policy and/or shifts in labor demand between unskilled
and skilled labor markets.
*  Thle  second tenn is likely to be positive and measures  the benefits derived
from an increase in consumption  to avoid  the inflation  tax.
*  The third term is positive and shows  the shift towards  indexed  assets
associated  with an increase in inflation.
*  The fouith term is ambiguous  and captures the impact of the maiginal
change in the nominal return on the indexed  asset or the financial  indexation
policy. If this change exceeds unity, then it is beneficial  to the asset holder
who is more than compensated  for the rise in inflation.
*  The fifth terrn is negative  and reflects  the negative  impact of the inflation
tax through cash holdings.
Equation (9) siates that an increase in consumption  (second  tern),  an elastic demand
for indexed  assets (third term), and a large  .ock of indexed  assets in the beginning  of period
as well as a widespread  financial  indexation  policy (fouirth  term) may offset  the negative
impact  of inflation  on real wages (first termn)  and on real monetary balances (fifth term). The
impact  of an increase in inflation is not necessary  negative on income.
6. (. ..continued)
a distributional perspective, is not too important as it does not vary too much across income
brackets (see next section).- 8 -
Oiie can see with more clarity, the factors  that militate  in favor  of the asselion that
the negative  impact of inflation  is likely to be more pronounced  for low income groups.
First, the poorest have less capacity,  if any, to switch  their cash holdin-s toward  indexed
assets --in terms of equation (9) this means a lower  a,, or even a nil one.  In additinn, as
suggested  above, the real wage  erosion is likely to be moie pronounced  .or low income
groups.  Therefore,  in order to avoid  the inflation  tax, the poorest agents can only resort to
changing their consumption pattern --resulting in an increase in c*>--  . For example, Cardoso
(1992)  describes that in an inflationary  context, wage  payments  are accelerated (e g. from
monthly to weekly)  and workers  tend to spenu.  their wages  when they get paid.  However,
the reduction in cash holdings  is not likely to be sufficient  to prevent a fall in real income
due to the erosion of mal wages  and the limited  access to indexed assets.
In summary,  the model consists in 5 income equations  corresponding  to each quintile.
Within  these equations, real wages  and financial  ass-'s behavioral  equations  are distinguished
to emphasize  the impact of infiation  on labor and capital incomes (the model applied to
Brazil is summarized  in Table  4).  The major limitation  of this model is that the infiation  rate
is assumed to be exogenous. The inflation rate is likely to influence  as well as be influenced
by income distribution. In particular, it is apparent that changes in the poftfolio of economic
agents will influence  the domestic rate of inflation. A second limitation  is that the
coefficients  in the assets equations  and in the real wages  equations  are likely to be vary with
the level of inflation. One can consider that the sensitivity  of assets demand to inflation will
be higher in period of high and variable  inflation  than in period of low inflation. With these
limitations  in mind, we will apply the model to the case of Brazil in the nexi section.
m.  An Application: the Case of Brazil
Brazil is well known  for its very unequal income distribt  n.  In 'fable 1, we present
an international  comparison  of household  income distribution by quintiles. Among the 16
countries, Brazil displays  the widest income gaps between the two extreme quintiles. The
poorest quintile receives about 3 percent of the income earned by the richest quintile. The
corresponding  share for Argentina  and Peru is 8 percent.  To some extent, the uneven
income distribution in Brazil reflects  the tremendous  regional disparities. Indeed, the states
of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro alone account for over half of GDP while hosting about 30Table I
An International Comparison of Income Distribution
Country  Years  Percentage Share of Households  Income
QUINT1  QUINT2  QUINT3  QUINT4  QUINT5  Q1/Q5
Peru  1985.86  4.4  8.5  13.7  21.'  51.9  0.08
Colombia  1988  4  8.7  13.5  20.8  53  0.07
Jamaica  1988  5.4  9.9  14.4  21.2  49.2  0.11
BoIswana  1985-86  2.5  6.5  11.8  20.2  59  0.04
Costa Rica  1986  3.3  8.3  13.2  20.7  54.5  0.06
Argentina  1989  4.7  7.3  11.6  18.7  57.7  0.08
Poland  1987  9.3  14.2  18  22.9  35.2  0.26
MalayL;a  1987  4.6  9.3  13.9  21.2  51.2  0.09
Venezuela  1987  4.7  9.2  14  21.5  50.6  0.09
Brazil  1983  2.4  5.7  10.7  18.6  62.6  0.03
Hungary  1983  10.9  15.3  18.7  22.8  32.4  0.33
Spain  1980-81  6.9  12.5  17.3  23.2  40  0.17
Israel  1979  6  12.1  17.8  24.5  39.6  0.15
Hong Kong  1980  5.4  10.8  15.2  21.6  47  0.11
Source: World Bank, World Development  Report (1991),  and Pessino(199  1) for Argentina
Table  2
Brazil: Income  Distribution and Macroeconomic  Performance
Period  Gini  Growth GDP Growth  Inflation
1971-76  1.57  10.29  27.2
1976-81  -0.86  5.23  58.3
1981-86  0.66  3.59  165
1986-89  2.47  2.29  742
Note:  An increase  in Gini implies  a worsening  of income distribution- 10 -
percent of the population. Recent studies seem to indicate that income distribution in Brazil
has even worsened  during the late 1980s (Barros, Rarnos, Mendoca, Rocha 1992).
Another feature of the Brazilian  economy  that has attracted  a lot of attention is
its high inflation  rates.  In 1992, Brazil had an annual inflation  rate of 1200 percent, one of
the highest in the world. The attractiveness  of applying the model to Brazi! lies precisely in
this combination  of skewed  income distribution  and high inflation  rates.  In Table  2, we
di,  _ the evolution  of income distribution  into four periods, and present for each one the
change in the Gini coefficient,  inflation, and GDP growth. During the first period (1971-76)
income distribution  worsens  in the context of a double-digit  growth and relatively  moderate
inflation rate.  It is a bit surprising to see income distribution  improve during the second
period (1976-81)  despite a doubling  of the average  inflation rate and reduction by half of
GDP growth. Less suiprising is the severe deterioration  of income distribution in 1986-90,
as shown by the 2.5 percent annual increase  in the Gini coefficient,  which corresponds  to
lowest  GDP growth and the highest inflation  rate.
While the negative  trend in income inequalities  can be explained  by a variety of
factors ranging  from changes in transfer policy  to demographic  and family compositions
changes, we consider that the fluctuations  in the domestic rate of inflation  are a key factor in
explaining  the changes in income distribution. As emp!.asized  by the above framework,  we
will attempt to assess whether rising inequalities  are related to labor and/or capital revenues
variations.
We would  like to emphasize  at the outset tvio comments. First, the purpose of this
paper is not to measure the impact  of inflation  the population's  well-being,  for which a host
of social indicators must be used as a proxy. Instead, we are merely attempting  to capture
shifts in income distribution  that can be attributed to inflation. Second, a few observations
about the data are in order.  The Gini coefficients  presented in Tible 2 (thereafter referred to
as official  Gini figures)  are based on household  surveys 7 conveyed  by official  agencies.  In
principle the earnings reported for these surveys  cover not only labor earnings, government
transfers  and pensions, but also non-wage  earnings. In practice, however,  labor earnings,
7.  For a more detailed discussion on the data see "Antedentes Estadisticos de
la Distribucion del Ingreso Brasil,  1970-1988, United Nations, CEPAL
(1990).- 11 -
government  transfers  and pensions  account  foe 95 percent of reported income (1989).  The
household  surveys,  hence fail to include non-labor  income which explains that reported
income accounted  for about 50 percent of GDP and 70 percent of consumption  (1989).  An
attracrive  feature of the data, however,  is that in-kinds  payments  and production for
selfconsumption  are taken into account.  Nonetheless,  the poor coverage  of capital income
tends to conceal the true income gaps.  For this reason, we decided to proceed by using the
household  survey  data as a measure of labor income rather than of total income.  We start
with the study of the impact of inflation  on labor income (Section A) before explicitly
incorporating  assets (Section B).  This will allow us to compare the official  Gini coefficients
to the modified  ones that include returns on financial  assets (Section  C).
A. Inflation  auid  Real Wages  in Brazil
The inflation  erosion of real wages  across quintiles is derived by log-
linearizing  the standard  real wage  equation (2).s We use as a dependant  variable  the average
real wages  per capita (for each quintile) obtained from the annual household  survey  described
above. The regression  estimates  using the OLS method cover the 1970-89  period.  One of
the limitations  of this analysis  is that the composition  of each quintile may vary over time.
Nevertheless,  these movements  are rather limited and should not bias the empirical results
regarding  the differential  of inflation  erosion of labor income between, say, the two extreme
quintiles. Furthermore, because our objective  is not to explain the differnces of wages  per
se, adjusting  for the numbers  of hours worked is not as important  as in eaming functions
based on human capital theory. Finally, as Morley and Avarez  (1991) in their study on
Argentina, we did not find any significant  relationship  between  inflation  and the
unemployment  rate.  The negative impact  of inflation  on labor income seems to be mostly
captured  through its impact  on real wages. 9
The results are summarized  in Table  4.  Overall, the results confirm the regressive
nature of inflation  on real wages. Inflation  is very regressive  with respect  to wage  income
because it erodes wage  for the two poorest quintiles while having  little effect  on the
8.  ln(Wi/P)  =  JO +  n,  ln(r)  +  B 2 ln(Z)
9.  See Alejandra Cox-Edwards (1991) for a discussion about why the
unemployment rate is low and fairly stable in Brazil.- 12 -
remaining  three quintiles. For the two poorest quintiles the elasticity of inflation  to the real
wage  are -.13 and -.09 respectively. These apparent low elasticities  hide the tremendous  loss
in real income induced by the acceleration  of inflation  in Brazil during the second half of the
1980s. Indeed, inflation  increased  on average  by 186 percent a year in 1986-90, leading to
drop in the real wage  of 24 percent and 17 percent for the two first quintiles respectively.
During the same period, real GDP increased on average  by 2.5 percent, leading to an
increase in the real wage  of less than two percent for the 40 percent poorest segment of the
Brazilian  population. By contrast, the richest 20 percent of the population  were not affected
by inflation  while enjoying  a growth induced increase  of wage  income of 2 percent.  The
adverse effect of inflation  of labor income in Brazil has also been documented  by Cardoso,
Barros and Urani (1993). They find a positive and significant  correlation between inflation
three different  measures  of inequality:  Gini, Spread, and Theil.  More importantly,  they find
a strong empirical evidence showing  that changes in inequality  in the 80s are unrelated  to
changes  associated  with education. This corroborates  our hypothesis  that macroeconomic
instability  lies at the heart of the worsening  of income distribution  in Brazil in the late 1980s
The negative  impact  of inflation  on real wages  may be partly explained  by the
changes in the demand for labor. Li period of high inflation, labor demand may shift away
from less skilled workers to more educated workers. In this case, the increased  earning gap
merely reflect differences  in productivity. It could be argued, though, that the erosion of
real wages for the poor is overestimated  as it does not capture the shift towards  the informal
sector in periods of macroeconomic  instability.'° Also, as suggested  in the above section,
more educated workers  may have  a higher bargaining  power to adjust their wages  to changes
in inflation. To the extent that inflation  and budget pressures  are forcing low-income  earners
and the government  to cut on human capital investment  this will exacerbate  income
distribution  in the future.  Finally, institutional  factors  such as the indexation  policy may
explain the above  results.
10.  In Peru, for instance, between  1980 and  1990 real wages in the private-formal
sector  declined by 64 percent, while real income in the infbrmal sector increased by 50
percent.- 13 -
Wage indexation  policy in Brazil can be traced back to the 1965 wage  law which
established  a control on the yearly rate of adjustment  of all wages in the formal economy."
This adjustment  was calculated  by the Federal government  taking into consideration  past and
future estimates  of inflation rate as well as GDP per-capita  growth.' 2 After the violent
strikes in 1978/79, a new wage  policy was adopted in October 1979. Three main changes
were introduced. First, the periodicity of the nominal wage  adjustment was shortened  from
one year to six months. Second, the productivity  gains which were government  determined
became freely bargained by employers  and employees. In case of d dispute, the decision was
left to a judge without any government's  interference. Finally, indexation  was made a
function of the wage  level with an overindexation  for lower brackets  and underindexation  for
upper brackets.  "  Certain occupations  managed  to increase their bargaining  power by
extending  the collective  bargaining  to the national level (e.g., financial  sector).  In 1980-89,
the relative wage  increased systematically  in all sectors with wages  above the industrial's
average. The picture varies also across regions. For instance  industrial workers in Sao
saolo managed  to increase their average  as well as total wage  bill continuously  between 1976
and 1988. Looking at the situation in the rral  area one notes a significant  drop in real
wages  compared  to the urban ones since, in particular since 1984 as inflation  accelerated  (see
Aguire 1992). Most unskilled workers in the rural area are paid the minimum  wage  which is
adjusted for inflation  only on a quarterly basis.  4
11.  This section draws extensively from a paper by J. Camargo and E Amadeo
(1990)  "  Labor Legislation and Institutional  Aspects of the Brazilian Labor
Market."
12.  Essentially, the wage indexing mechanism became a income policy
instrument that resulted in a decline in real wages as  future inflation rates
were systematically underestimated:  in the manufacturing industry il  fell by
a quarter between  1964 and  1967.  The combination of the wage policy and
tight monetary policy led to a decline in the annual inflation rate from more
than  100 percent in 1964 to less than 20 percent in 1973, with very little
effect on unemployment. A description of the wage policy can be found in
Simonsen (1983).
13.  In principle, this differential in indexation would have brought progressivity
to the system.  In practice, however, it might have induced employers to
find ways of hiring, at a lower cost, outside the legal boundaries.
14.  In December  1992, a new wage policy was negotiated between the
Chamber of Deputies'Labor Committee and the government and will take
effect January  1,  1993.  Under this policy workers earning up to six
(continued...)- 14  -
Clearly, the deterioration  of the macroeconomic  performance  since 1986 has
contributed to the deterioration  of income distribution  in Brazil.  As we show next, this is
even more so once financial  assets are taken into account.
B.  The Inpact of Inflation  on Financial  Assets in Brazil
We will only deal with financial  wealth because data on real wealth (capital, real
asset) are not available. The regressive  impact of inflation  on income distribution will
certainly  be underestimated  as the rates of return on real assets, mostly held by the wealthiest
income groups, are generally  equal or higher than the rate of inflation  in periods of high
inflation. The same can be said of subsidized  credits, which are not included in our analysis.
In the case of Brazil, financial  wealth is mostly composed  of money,  deposits,  and
public bonds (see Table 3).  In contrast to most Latin American  countries, savings in foreign
currency  was limited  during the 1980s."  During 1970-89,  overall financial  wealth  grew
very fast from 35.9 percent of GDP in 1970 to about 70 percent in 1989, after a sharp
decline to 28.5 percent of GDP in 1980. Simultaneously,  the composition  of financial  wealth
shifted dramatically  from money to indexed  assets.  The decline in cash holdings, reaching
an unprecedent  low level of 5.8 percent of GDP in 1989, was more than compensated  by an
increase in indexed  bank deposits from 1 percent to 27.6 percent of GDP. The share of
government  bonds in percentage  of GDP also increased substantially  over the last two
decades.  The changes in the size and the composition  of financial  wealth can be associated
to variations  in the rate of inflation. The progressive  shift from liquidity toward indexed
14.(. ..continued)
minimum wages will be entitled to a full inflation adjustment of their  salary
every four months and advances every other month in the amount of at least
60 percent of the prevailing inflation rate.
15.  Capital flight in Brazil has not been has perverse as in other countries in
Latin America.  It should be noted, however, that the current political
instability has triggered massive outflows.  The day Gustavo Krause
resigned as finance minister more than $300 million fled the country
(Gazetta Mercantil December  1992).Table 3:  Brazil
Composition  of Financial  Wealth
In Percent  of GDP
Years  Money  a/  Deposits  b/  Public Bonds  Total
1970  14.1  1.1  19.0  34.2
1971  13.9  1.8  17.1  32.8
1972  15.0  3.5  14.7  33.2
1973  16.8  4.1  13.3  34.2
1974  15.2  5.0  12.1  32.2
1975  15.9  6.6  10.5  33.0
1976  13.8  7.4  9.5  30.7
1977  13.2  9.0  8.8  30.9
1978  13.9  14.4  6.7  35.0
1979  14.8  15.3  4.8  34.9
1980  11.5  12.1  8.4  32.0
1981  10.8  14.9  9.6  35.3
1982  9.2  17.8  7.6  34.6
1983  7.3  22.3  12.6  42.2
1984  6.6  24.2  17.5  48.2
1985  7.6  24.8  9.8  42.1
1986  6.9  17.0  18.6  42.4
1987  8.5  26.0  32.9  67.4
1988  7.3  36.0  35.6  78.8
1989  5.8  27.6  0.0  33.5
Source:  Central Bank of Brazil
a/ Including  currency  and current  deposits
b/ Including  savings  and fixed-termr  deposits- 16 -
assets corresponded  to a rise in domestic  inflation  from an average  of 40 percent in 1976-79
to a 100 percent in 1980-82, and above 200 percent in 1983-89.
The question addressed in this paper is to determnine  how the changes  depicted above
have affected  income distribution in Brazil.  Ideally,  one would need to have  data on asset
distribution  across income groups to determine  the regressive  impact  of inflation.  On this
basis, the assets demands elasticities  witb respect to inflation  would be derived for each
income group, in line with the analysis  carried out above for labor income. In absence of
such data, we were compelled  to work with elasticities  derived from aggregate  asset
demands. The obvious limitation  of such approach is the implicit  assumption  of equality of
asset demand elasticities  across income groups.  For instance, an increase in inflation  will
reduce the demand for money  by an equal percentage  for each income groups even though it
can be argued that wealthier  agents adjust more rapidly.  Equal elasticity,  of coturse,  implies
that assets shares are constant over time.  In order to circumvent  this limitation, we will
undertake some sensitivity  analysis  on asset distributions  in the next section.
In order to assess the impact of a change in the domestic inflation  rate on the total
demand of money, deposits, and public bonds in Brazil, we estimated  a standard  portfolio
model over the 1970-89  period.  A crucial issue in these regressions  is our assumptions  of
constant coefficient  on the macroeconomic  variables. The use of annual data did not turn out
to affect  too much the estimated  parameters , which correspond  to the priors and are broadly
in line with other studies (see Rodriguez 1991). As shown in Thble  4, inflation  clearly
affects  asset demands. As expected,  the impact of inflation  is negative  on the demand for
money,  but positive on both the demands for bonds and deposits. Also, an increase in
income influences  positively the demand for money,  negatively  the demand for bonds, and
not significantly  the demand for deposits.  6 The negative  impact  of an increase in income
on bonds suggests  that this asset has been used in periods of slower  growth  or recession
16.  In order  to capture the effect of income on assets demands, we used the
level of labor income measured in the households survey described  in the
precedent section. In the bonds and deposits demands, we defined the level
of income as the sum of the last three "quintiles" of the population, but for
the money demand,  the income is defined as the sum of the five quintiles.
We also attempt to estimate the different asset demands as a function of
each income category.  But, the high degree of colinearity between these
explanatory variables biased the empirical results.  Finally, the results
obtained  can be compared to those estimated with GDP.- 17 -
(buffer stock).  This result may be biased since public bonds are not always  willingly  held
by the private sector but also compulsory  allocated by the Government  to pensions funds or
domestic banks. Under these circumstances,  the increase in the stock of bonds during
periods of slow growth may be interpreted  as the result of an increase in supply rather than
in demand.
Finally, the relationship  between inflation  and the nominal  rates of return on indexed
assets has to be defined in order to assess the impact of inflation  on the revenues  derived
from these assets. Both the nominal  interest rate on deposits  and public bonds were
positively  and significantly  correlated to the rate of inflation  (see third pane ''ef rable 4).
But if deposits appear as a safe instrument  to protect against inflation  --the correlation
coefficient  is 1.599--, Government's  paper were less than fully indexed --the correlation
coefficient  is only 0.425-- during 1970-89.
C  The Total Effect of Inflation on Income Distribution
The complete  model, as summarized  in Table  4, consists of the five real wages
equations, the portfolio model including  the demands for money,  depob,its  and bonds, and the
correlation between the nominal rates of return of indexed  assets and the inflation  rate.  The
discussion in this section is organized  around four issues.  First, the choice regarding  asset
shares is examined  for two different  scenarios. Second, the results are presented  by adding
the wage  effect and the asset demand effects  and arrive at the total inflation  tax (TIT).
Third, the official  Gini coefficients  are compared to our adjusted series.  Finally, the
robustness  and limitations  of our results are discussed.
Asset shares scenario I:  In general our assumptions  on asset shares  are based on
some broad results of the inventory  approach  to money  demand and some obvious limitations
to the access of indexed assets for certain income groups.  As far as cash holdings  are
concerned, we assume that the two lowest  quintiles determine  their real money  balances  as a
function of their income (Cardoso  (1992)). We assume that these agents are paid monthly
and spend 75 percent of their income on the day they get paid and the other 25 percentTable 4: The  Complete Model
Brazil: 1970-1989
Wags Equations: (t-statistics in parenthesis,  in logs)
Qulnitile I  w(t)  u  2.87  *0.13  infl(t)  +  0.58  Z(t)  R2 a0.67  DWV 2.28
(-2.59)  (4.48)
Quinitile 11  w2(t) m  3,20  -0.13  1nfl(t)  +  0.62  Z(t)  R2 - 0.88  DW - 2.10
(.2.93)  (7.95)
Quinitile iII  w3(t)  4.40  -0.13infl(t)  +  0.49Z(t)  R2 0.78  DW-1  77
(1..38)  (5.26)
Qulnitile  IV  w4(t)  a  4.07  0.13  infl(t)  + 0.60 Z(t)  R2 .0.88  DW - 1.85
(-1.06)  (7.03)
Quinitile  V  w5(t) *  4.13  -0.13  infl(t)  + 0.78 Z(t)  R2 a 0.88  DW - 1.66
(-O.  a1)  (6.8  6)
Assets  Equations:  (t-etati.tics  in parenthsis,  in logs))
Money  Demand  m(t)  - -0.272  + 0.244 Z wi(t)  - 0.126 infl(t)  0.658m(t-1)  R2 - 0.70  DW -2.14
(-0.12)  (1.45)  (5.24)
Deposits  Demand  d(t)  u  3.358  0.142  £m  w(t)  0.169infl(t)  0.768d(t-1)  R2 - 0.97  DW  2.29
(0.49)  (-0.36)  (1.76)  (6.16)
Bonds Demand  b(t)  *  9.710  0.649  £ wi(t)  0.318 infl(t)  0.800 m(t-1)  R2  = 0.77  DW-  2.21
(1.92)  (0-1.71)  (2.94)  (4.63)
Rates  of Return:
Correlation  between  the Nominal  Interest  on Deposits  (rd(t)) and InfI (t):  1.599
Correlation between  the Nominal  Interest  on Bonds  (rb(t)) and infI(t)  0.425
Income per Quintile:
yi(t)  =  wiYt)  +  (-infl(t)/(1+infl(t))  oim(t)  +  ((1+rd(t)(1  +infl(t))-1)Iid(t)  + ((1+  rb(t))/(1+infI(t))-1)pib(t)
with  i - 1,2,3,4,5
Shares of Assets (in percent of total stock)::
Scenano  1:  Scenano  1l:
Money  Deposits  Bonds  Money  Deposits  Bonds
oi  Bi  pi  ii  Si  pi
Quinitile  I  0.25y1(t)  0  0  Quinitile  I  0.25y1(t)  0  0
Quinitile  II  0.25y2(t)  0  0  Quinitile il  0.25y2(t)  0  0
Quinitile III  0.20  0.07  0.20  Quinitile  III  0.10  0.07  0.10
Quinitile IV  0.30  0.18  0.45  Quinitile IV  0.15  0.18  0.20
Quinitile  V  .4.25(y1+y2)/  0.75  0.35  Quinitile  V  7- 2
5(yl+y2)l  0.75  0.70
Notations:
wift)  rel  wagm  per  quintiAe  infl(t/  domestic  rate  of inflation
mlt)  ng  ts/  real  money  atock  rd(ti  nominr  l int  oret on dapo-it
d/tJ  total  r"l  depitr  stoc/k  rb/)  nominhl  Intaroot  rato  on  bonds
b/t)  total  real  piublic  bondsa  tock  ZIt)  GDP
yi  reel  income  per  quinte  oi  here  of money  held  Group  i
Iii  whare  of dpolta hel by Group  i  pi  here  of honda  held  by  Group  ;- 19  -
evenly during the rest of the period.' 7 The cash holding shares for the remaining  three
quintiles are allowed  to vary for the two scenarios. In the first one, the third and fourth
quintiles hold 20 percent and 30 percent of the total money stock at time t,  and the fifth
quintile the rest (on average  35 percent in 1970-89). For the remaining  two assets, the
allocation is simplified  by using the ralistic  assumption  that the two lowest  income groups
do not have  access to public bonds and savings  deposits. This is can be easily justified on
the grounds that a minimum  amount -higher  than the real income of these two groups-- is
generally  required to open a savings  account or to purchase public bonds.' 8 The third and
fourth quintiles are assumed to hold  7 and 18 percent of deposits and 20 and 45 percent of
public bonds.  Assuming  a linear budget constraint, we can therefore  deduce that the group 5
holds 75 percent of total deposits, and 35 percent of total public bonds. These assumptions
are made to reflect the conventional  wisdom that indexed  assets are mostly held by the
highest  income groups.
Asset shares scenario II:  In this case, we deliberately  modify  the allocation of assets
to reduce the gains falUing  on the richest quintile.  We do so despite  the fact that including
other indexed  assets in the framework  would  certainly tilt the balance in the other direction.
Nevertheless,  the second scenario  assumes a higher ;oncentration  of money and bonds in the
hands of Group 5.  This group is allowed to hold on average  55 percent of total money  in
1970-89  and 70  percent of total bonds (1970-89). The proportions  of money  demand
allocated  to the third and fourth quintiles  are reduced to 10 and 15 percent respectively. The
corresponding figures for bonds are 10 and 20 percent.  By contrast, the asset allocation for
the first two quintiles is left unaltered.  This was done after noticing  that, given the range of
assets available  to these groups, significant  changes in the relevant  parameters  affected  very
little the outcome.  For example,  a change in the frequency  of wage  payments  from monthly
17.  Accordingly, the inflation tax losses for Groups  I and 2 are equal to:
(0.25(W-i*12)(-r/(1  +ar)))  i  1,2
where W-; is the monthly wage of the Group i and  erm  the monthly inflation rate.
18.  This assumption is consistent with the inventory model of Marcelo C'ortes
Neri (1990) in which agents eaming  less than  10 minimum salaries do not
hold bonds  See also Bourguignon, de Melo, and Suwa (1991).- 20 -
to weekly would  reduce the average  inflation  tax from 2.9 percent to 0.7 percent of the
Group I income during the 1980-89  period.  As we shall see, this Is relatively small
compared to the loss related  to the negative  impact  of inflation  on the labor income.
Similarly,  the distribution  of deposits  across income groups is left unchanged. We felt that
any reasonable  modification  of this distribution  would exacerbate  the regressive  impact of
inflation. Indeed, the first scenario already assumes that the middle class (groups 3 and 4)
hold demand deposits  equivalent  to 24-35 percent of their annual income (1970-89). By way
of comparison, the corresponding  figure for the richest quintile is 40 percent.
The Total  Inflation  lTx (Tll):  It is defined  as the overall change in income induced
by variations  in inflation, including  both the real wage  and the asset demand effects. A
negative  number indicates that inflation  has reduced income and a positive number that
inflation  has acted as a subsidy. The results are presented  both as a percentage  of total
income and in absolute values (million of 1986 cruzeiros). In the first case it is equivalent  to
an income tax rate.  The results are shown in Table  5 for 1980-89  under the two
aforementioned  scenarios. For the first scenario, all income groups, except the fifth quintile,
incurred an income loss.  When all quintiles are considered  as a group, the income loss
attributed to the TIT is estimated at 8.3 percent of total income. This high figure contrasts
with the majority of studies because it includes not only the impact of inflation  on liquidity
but also on public bonds, deposits and real wages  (for a comparison  see for example Easterly
and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991)). The first quintile lost an equivalent  of 19 percent of its income
of which 16 percent is attributeci  to a decline in real wages  and the rest to the inflation  tax.
The middle class has been the most devastated  by inflation, losing an equivalent  of 38
percent of annual income for the third quintile  and 32 percent for the fourth one.  By
contrast, the richest quintile witnessed  an increase in income exceeding  7 million cruzeiros,
or .1 percent of its income. This took place as they were able to protect themselves  against
inflation  by shifting  from money  to indexed  assets. In short, increased  inequality is due to
the conjunction  of two factors: an increase in income for the wealthiest  and a strong
deterioration  of the position of the poor and the middle class." 9 The negative  effect of
19.  Cardoso (1992), has estimated the inflation tax borne by the lowest quintile
in Brazil to be rather modest.  Even in 1990, when the annual inflation rate
reached 2700 percent,  the tax was amounted to only  1.6 of income.  In the
context of overall income distribution, however, this finding might conceal
the big picture because if fails to take into account the potential gains of
(continued...)- 21 -
inflation  operated  through a decline in real wages  for the poor and through financial  for the
middle classes (particularly  Group 3).  Assets  revenues  losses of middle classes in Brazil
were large not only because of the inflation  tax on real monetary balances, but also due to
the incomplete  indexation  of bonds in the second half of the 1980s.
Considering  the significant  increase in bonds over the period one might be tempted to
say that agents were partially compensated  through  an expansionary  fiscal policy. It turns
out that our wage  data include government  transfers  as well.  As such the inflation erosion of
wages  is net of any transfer. Indeed, up to 1991, the social security benefits were not fulFly
indexed  to inflation  leading to substantial  erosion of the actual replacement  rate.  It is equally
important  to note that the apparent overestimation  of interest income, due to the exclusion  of
the interest income tax, should be viewed  in light of the offsetting  impact on income
distribution  of indirect taxes and the Tani-effect.3 0
The assumptions  in the scenario I  are designed to reduce the gains for the fifth
quintile.  Although  in this case, this group moves  from an .1 percent gain in income to a 3.5
percent drop in income the outcome from an income distribution  perspective remain the
same.  Again, one must remember  that not all indexed  assets are included in our model and
the share of indexed demand deposits  for the richest quintile has been purposely
underestimated. Correcting  for these two effects  would clearly increase the regressive  nature
of inflation. Nevertheless,  the extent to which the official  Gini coefficients  understate  the
increase in inequality  during the 1980s, merit further attention.
19.(. ..continued)
holders of indexed assets.  Her analysis is limited to the high powered
money, hence fails to take into account the distributional implications of
unequal abilities to shift towards indexed assets.
20.  The argument is that there is a flow of income due to indirect taxes that is
going from individuals to the government.  Relative to total income this
leakage is more important for low income agents.  Furthermore,  the
transfer  that is implicit in the Tanzi-effect will accrue mostly to banks and
firms, hence to capitalists.  For instance, banks have a retention period for
social security contributions,  thus partly capture the erosion  of government
revenues at higher inflation rates.Table 5a:
Average  Impact of  Inflation  on Income (1980-89)
In percent  of Total  Incorne of each Group
Scenario I
Group I  Group II  Group IlIl  Group IV  Group V
Labor  Income  Change  -15.98%  -4.70%  -2.14%  -0.80%  -0.17%
Asset  Income Change  -2.87%  -3.01%  -36.41%  -31.04%  0.25%
Total  (TIT)  -18.85%  -7.71%  -38.55%  -31.85%  0.08%
Table 5b:
Average  Impact  of Inflation  on Income (1980-89)
In Mio of  1986  Cruzeiros
Scenario I
Group I  Group II  Group III  Group IV  Group V
Labor Income Change  -58.90  -39.47  -21.93  -15.35  -15.63
Asset  Incorne Change  -10.58  -25.27  -373.30  -594.93  23.32
Total  (TIT)  -69.47  -64.74  -395.23  -610.28  7.69Table 5c:
Average Impact Df Inflation on Income (1  980-89)
In percent of Total Income
Scenario  II
Group I  Group II  Group III  Group IV  Group V
Labor Income Change  -15.98%  -4.70%  -1.96%  -0.72%  -0.177%
A.sset  Income Change  -2.87%  -3.01%  -25.22%  -17.05%  -3.29%
Total  (TIT)  -18.85%  -7.71%  -27.  9%  -17.77%  -3.47%
Taible  5d:
Average Impact or Inflation on Income (1980-89)
In Mio of 1986 Cruzeiros
Scenario  II
Group I  Group II  Group Ill  Group IV  Group V
Labor Income Change  -58.90  -39.47  -21.93  -15.35  -15.63
Asset Income Change  -10.58  -25.27  -281.66  -365.83  -297.43
Total (TIT)  -69.47  -64.74  -303.58  -381.18  -313.06- 24 -
Official  vs Adjusted  Gini Coefficients: The results are presented in terms of Gini
coefficients  because they capture the shifts in income distribution  over time.  Other measures
such as the poverty  line or the difference  between  the two extreme  income groups would  fail
to take into account the entire population. The results obtained in scenarios  I and II indicate
that inequality  increased significantly  in the 1980s, and in particular in 1988 and 1989.  This
is hardly surprising considering  the acceleration  of inflation  in the late 1980s.  We also find
that the distribution of income derived from scenario I is substantially  less equal than the one
depicted by  household  surveys. Of course, the gap widened during the high inflation
regime.  For example, the difference  between both measures reached  9.5 percent in 1989
(with an annual inflation  ratc above 1300  percent), but was insignificant  during the first half
of the seventies  when the annual inflation  rate was below 30 percent.  As expected,  the first
scenario displays  a higher average  Gini coefficient  than the second one.  But, more
importantly,  both capture the increase  in income  inequality in response to higher injlation
during the second half of the 1980s.  Over the 1980-89  period, income inequality  increased
by 11.3 percent and 7.7 percent in Cases 1 and 2 respectively,  but only by 4.7 according  to
official  figures. Finally, we test the prediction  power  of the model by projecting the Gini
coefficients  over the 1990-92  years (see Figure 1 and Table  6).  We can notice that
inequality  increase significantly  in 1990 as the result of extremely  high inflation (above  2400
percent) and negative  GDP growth.  Subsequently,  income inequality  seems to be reduced as
the inflation  rate declined in 1991 and 1992. The fact that inflation  in 1993 is on the rise
again does not augur well for the poor and middle cla'.s.
Robustness  and Limitations: There are basically two related  assumptions  of the
analytical  framework  that deserve scrutiny. First, we assume that elasticities in the real
wages  and asset-demands  equations are constant over time.  The dramatic  changes in the
macroeconomic  environment  as well in institutions  have unambiguously  affected  the response
of economic  agents to inflation. A good illustration  of these changes is found in the
evolution  of wage  indexing  policy described in the previous  section.  Second, and probably
of more significance,  it can be argued that the asset demand elasticities  are not only different
over time but also across income groups. In the first section, we pointed out that
Sturzenegger  (1992) has recently argued  that the portfolio adjustment  speed with respect to
inflation is positively correlated  to the level of wealth.  It is certainly realistic that higher
income groups will adjust more rapidly their portfolio than lower income groups in a contex.Figure 1: Brazil; Gini Coefficient
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Table  6: Brazil
Comparison  of  Income Distribution
Gini Coefficient
Year  Baoe  Nne  Official
Scenario I  Scenario 11  Figures
1970  0.490  0.491  0.490
1971  0.493  0.486  0.493
1972  0.498  0.483  0.495
1973  0.601  0.490  0.500
1974  0.514  0.491  0.510
1975  0.616  0.496  0.511
1976  0.524  0.501  0.518
1977  0.526  0.603  0.518
197S  0.526  O.Fo7  0.519
1979  0.634  0.612  0.524
1980  0.548  0.621  0.632
1981  0.647  0.621  0.631
1982  0.546  0.622  0.530
1983  0.663  0.627  0.533
1984  0.660  0.538  0.637
1986  0.663  0.642  0.640
1988  0.665  0.636  0,539
1987  0.652  0.542  0.544
1988  0.588  0.653  0.552
1989  0.610  0.6e1  0.657
1990  0.633  0.568  0.660
1991  0.591  0.544  0.648
1992  0.596  0.561  0.564- 26 -
of high inflation. Based on a sensitivity  analysis, it turns out that the results are not
significantly  affected  by allowing  asset demand elasticities  to vary across incon.2  groups.  In
fact, we show  that the range of elasticities  values is relatively  limited due to the total budget
constraint and given the linkage  between elasticities  and the shares of assets allocated to each
quintile. For example, in 1989, by allowing  changes in elasticities  for deposits across groups
3, 4 and 5, the maximum  variation  in the Gini coefficient  allowed was only 0.6 percent. 2'
Overall, we found that the Gini coefficients  are relatively  inelastic to changes in given shares
of assets.
IV. CONCLUDING  REMARKS
We subscribe to the view that income distribution  more than a simple welfare
measure is a key indicator of social stability  or the willingness  of different  groups to adhere
to a social contract.  This belief, in turn, explains our interest in trying to understand better
the intricate relationships  between inflation  and income distribution. The simple analytical
framework  presented in this paper shows  the extent to which inflation  could create winners
as well as losers.  This framework  was then applied to Brazil, well known  for its
combination  of high inflation  and skewed  income distribution. Our findings  lead us to argue
21.  The demand  elasticities  of deposits for groups 4 and 5 can be expressed  as
E`4  =  1  -I  +  04,/04,,  >  0
ed5  d  =  Ed_I  +  a55O5,/°  >  0
where el denote the total  demand elasticities  for deposits  with respect to
inflation,  ed5 and ed4 the demand  elasticities  of group 4 and 5 respectively,
and oS and o4 the amounts  of deposits  held by groups 5 and 4 in percentage
of total deposits.
Given  the total budget  constraint,  the demand  elasticity  fbr deposits  of Group 3 can
be wrinten  as:
si3  =  ed  ed-55t  +  ed 4a 4 L/( 0 3 )  >  0
In our sensitivity  analysis,  we fixed the shares of deposits  allocated  to each
quintile  (as in both scenarios),  and we modified  the elasticities  of each
groups given the total  estimated  elasticity  (see table 4) and the assumption
that demand  elasticities  for deposits  cannot be negative. The maximum
variation  in the Gini coefficient  allowed  was 0.6 percent when compared to
the result obtained  in Scenario 1.  In addition,  we proceeded  to several
alternative  simulations. The results  are of course available  upon request.- 27 -
that the impact of inflation  on income distribution  cannot be assessed by examining  its impact
on real wages  and cash holdings  only. Instead, one also needs to include indexed  assets to
which some agents shift as inflation rises.  We call the net effect on income the total inflation
tax (TlI),  in which the well known inflation  tax is just one component. In a framework  that
includes money,  demand deposits and bonds as well as the effect of inflation  on real wages,
we showed  that inflation  has contributed  to the worsening  of income distribution in Brazil.
In 1980-89  the lowest  quintile in Brazil witnessed an annual TIT of about 19 percent, of
which 16 percent is attributed to real wage  erosion and the inflation  tax the rest.  The
Brazilian middle class, however,  is probably the biggest looser. The first and fourth quintile
have  lost over 30 percent of their annual income. In sharp contrast, the fifth quintile has
managed  to insulate itself from inflation by taking advantage  of high real interest rates on
demand deposits  without losing on the labor income side.  Official  income distribution
figures based on household  surveys  data underestimate  inequality  in Brazil as they virtually
ignore capital income.  This is even more so in an inflationary  environment,  as an important
channel through which income distribution  is altered is omitted.  We showed  that adjusting
for financial  assets significantly  magnifies  the observed worsening  of income distribution in
Brazil in the 1980s.
The question  that is immediately  raised by the distributional  effects  of inflation
is whether they help explain the delays in adopting  a stabilization  program in Brazil.  There
is a body of literature  that indeed links the likelihood  of a reform to its distributional
consequences. The status-quo  prevails either from the principle of concentrated  effect (Bliss
1987)  or the uncertainty  about the outcome  of the reform (Fernandez  and Rodrik 1992). In
the first case, the tcform is held prisoner by a well organized minority  while in the second
the incidence  of the reform  cannot be determined  ex-ante, hence fails to be implemented.
Advocates  of this line of argument would certainly  ascribe the persistence  of inflation  in
Brazil to political  polarization and the corollary unequal burden of inflation. The conflict
that often arise-not only in Brazil-between  the executive  and the legislative,  the central and
local governments  over the content and/or the pace of a stabilization  program can indeed
attest of differences  in bargaining  power and opportunity  cost of eradicating inflation.
The fact that in Brazil the mandatory  indexation  of pension  benefits in effect since 1991 is
embedded  in the 1988 constitution  clearly suggests  that there are obvious linkages between
macroeconomic  instability  and the political  process.  In April of this year the Brazilians
undertook  a plebiscite  about the form of government  they would like to adopt.  If the fate of
inflation  were to be decided by the majority it would  probably loose, but not without a fight.- 28 -
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